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INTRODUCTION

In Alexander v. Sandoval,' the Supreme Court broke sharply
with thirty years of tradition,2 holding that section 602 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 implies no private right of action.' Prior to
Sandoval, private individuals enforced federal regulations enacted
1. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
2. The Supreme Court, 2000 Term: Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 498
(2001).
3. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285-86. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes several
different sections, each referred to as Title VI, Title VII, etc. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(2000) (Title VI); id. § 2000e (Title VII). Title VI correlates to sections 601 and 602.
Likewise, Title VII correlates to sections 701, 702, etc. Each title addresses a different
subject area. Title VI outlines the prohibitions against racial discrimination for federal
fund recipients. Title VII establishes the laws regarding employment discrimination. This

Comment will use "Title VI" to refer to sections 601 and 602 generally, and will use
"section 601" and "section 602" to refer to the specific sections of the Act. Section 601
flatly prohibits racial discrimination in federally funded programs. Section 602 authorizes
federal agencies to enact regulations to further this prohibition.
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pursuant to section 602 by bringing private causes of action.
Numerous federal agencies have enacted regulations that prohibit
policies and actions that have racially disparate effects.' Plaintiffs
sued under these regulations to combat problems such as
environmental racism, racial inequalities in education, and overall
general barriers that limit the access and participation of racial
minorities in public programs. Sandoval has closed a door that was
once essential to ensuring the enforcement of civil rights legislation
and providing equal opportunity to people of all races and
ethnicities.6 Without an avenue through which individuals can
enforce section 602 privately, civil rights may take a step backward.'
Now, plaintiffs must be creative and find new ways to achieve the
4. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285-86.
5. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 528.9(b) (2002) (prohibiting discriminatory effects in housing
loans); 24 C.F.R. § 6.4(a)(1)(ix) (2002) (prohibiting discriminatory effects in housing); 34
C.F.R. § 100.3(2) (2002) (prohibiting discriminatory effects in determining the types of
services or benefits that will be provided under a program or activity receiving federal
funding); 40 C.F.R. § 7.30 (2001) (prohibiting discriminatory effects in programs that
receive funds from the Environmental Protection Agency).
6. Carolyn Magnuson, 'Disparate-Impact'Suits May Survive After High Court Ruling
on Civil Rights Act, TRIAL, July 2001, at 17, 96.
7. Those federal agencies with insufficient staff may be unable to devote the
resources necessary to enforce the civil rights violations that were once handled by private
parties. See, e.g., Julie Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope of School Finance and Resource
Compatibility Litigation, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 527, 554 (2001) (stating that the
Department of Justice will not have the capacity to bring suits against all violators).
Individuals who seek redress for violations of section 602 regulations may now be forced
to file administrative complaints with federal agencies rather than going to court, which
may limit some avenues of redress. See, e.g., Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner,
Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to
Inappropriateand Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 409 (2001) (exploring the benefits of combining the relevant
strengths of disability law and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fight systemic
discriminatory problems in special education of minority students). For political and
administrative reasons, agencies are sometimes limited in their capacity to mandate
redress for aggrieved plaintiffs. The only penalty an agency can impose on a federal fund
recipient is termination of funds. But the all or nothing nature of such a penalty makes it
an unattractive option. If an agency terminated funds because of a single violation, it
would at the same time be harming numerous other innocent students because less funds
would then be available for their education. This is not to suggest that the threat of such a
measure is not effective in persuading compliance with Title VI, but as a practical matter,
it will be difficult for an agency to completely withhold funds from a recipient if the
recipient fails to comply with Title VI. For instance, the Department of Education has
only terminated funds on two occasions in the past two decades. See In re W. Palm Beach
Beauty & Barber Sch., No. 97-107-ST, 1997 WL 1048281, at *4 (E.D.O.H.A. Oct. 23,
1997); In re Unified Sch. Dist., No. 89-33-CR (89-IX-3), 1992 WL 220791, at *1
(E.D.O.H.A. Apr. 30, 1992). Further, the decreased enforcement that may result from
inadequate federal resources and the absence of the threat of litigation may cause
violations to increase and push the problem toward a vicious cycle.
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same ends that implied causes of action under section 602 provided
for the past thirty years. This Comment proposes three new theories
by which a plaintiff might bring a private cause of action to enforce
regulations enacted under section 602.
First, this Comment will analyze the Court's decision in
Alexander v. Sandoval, determining the scope of the decision and how
it squares with other relevant Supreme Court decisions and Circuit
Court interpretations of this precedent. Next, this Comment will
discuss three options by which individuals may enforce section 602
regulations through a private cause of action. The most widely
discussed theory, but one that recently has fallen into disfavor, is that
§ 1983 would provide a cause of action regardless of whether Title VI
creates a cause of action because § 1983 is meant to enforce all federal
laws that protect individual rights. If Title VI regulations are
interpreted as "laws," section 602 regulations create the private rights
and § 1983 creates the cause of action to enforce them.8 A second,
and yet undiscussed and untried theory, draws upon Supreme Court
precedent from the Title IX context. The theory is that deliberate
indifference toward violations of Title VI regulations would support a
cause of action. The Supreme Court already has established that
deliberate indifference toward unintentional violations of Title IX
establishes the basis for private causes of action in sexual harassment
cases, 9 and the underlying reasoning is also applicable to Title VI
regulations.1" Discussing a third theory, this Comment shows how
fact patterns that would give rise to a deliberate indifference claim
would also establish an intentional discrimination claim if framed
correctly." Thus, even if the Supreme Court refused to explicitly
extend deliberate indifference to cover disparate impact regulations,
plaintiffs still might be able to prove intentional discrimination under
traditional intent standards.
I. ANALYSIS OF SANDOVAL

The plaintiff in Sandoval challenged an Alabama policy of only
administering drivers' license tests in English. 2 The plaintiff claimed
8. Infra notes 48-147 and accompanying text. The accompanying text, however,
reveals recent Supreme Court developments that are very damaging to this theory. See
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002).
9. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-49 (1999); Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998).
10. Infra notes 148-218 and accompanying text.
11. Infra notes 219-42 and accompanying text.
12. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278-79 (2001).
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that the law had a disparate impact on certain non-English
ethnicities. 13 The Supreme Court, however, found that no implied
private cause of action existed to enforce Title VI regulations. 4 The
Court reached its conclusion by conceptualizing sections 601 and 602

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as two distinct entities. 5 The Court
concluded that section 601 creates individual rights with the language

'no person ... shall ...be subjected to discrimination .. .
According to the Supreme Court, this language creates a private right
of action, but it only prohibits intentional discrimination. Similarly,
the language of section 602 authorizes federal agencies to enact
regulations to further the purposes of section 601 and ensure that
recipients of federal funds do not engage in discrimination.17
However, the Court found that section 602 focuses neither on the
person regulated nor the persons protected; rather, it focuses on the
agencies. 8 Thus, according to the Court, nothing in section 602
confers any private rights beyond those created in section 601.19
Agencies may use section 602 to further the conferred rights of
section 601, but section 602 cannot create new private rights that are
not contained in section 601, nor can it create an additional private
cause of action. 20 Because section 601 only prohibits intentional
discrimination and section 602 only furthers rights granted in section
601, section 602 cannot create an independent private cause of action
13. See id.
14. The test for finding an implied cause of action is relatively high. Bradford C.
Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations,49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321,
323 (2001). In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court considered four factors
to determine whether an implied private right of action exists under a statute: (1) whether
the plaintiff is one of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there
is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to deny one; (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiffs; and (4) whether the cause of action is
one traditionally relegated to state law. Id. at 78. The Sandoval Court applied the Cort
test and found that no implied private right of action exists under section 602. Sandoval,
532 U.S. at 287-91.
15. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285-86. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally assisted programs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(2000). Section 602 authorizes the federal agencies providing funding to such programs to
effectuate the provisions of section 601. Id. § 2000d-1. Section 601 creates the implied
cause of action by expressly prohibiting intentional discrimination. Thus, although
disparate impacts are discrimination, they are not always intentional, and under Sandoval,
seemingly are not subject to an implied private cause of action. Id. at 293.
16. § 2000d.
17. Sandoval,532 U.S. at 289.
18. Id. at 289-90.
19. Id. at 289.
20. Id. at 291-92.
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for disparate impact.21 In sum, in so far as section 602 regulations

proscribe activities permitted by section 601, they are not enforceable
by an implied private right of action.22
Many federal agencies have enacted regulations that prohibit
activities that have the effect of discriminating or result in disparate
impact.23 In Sandoval, the Court did not address whether federal
agencies can properly enact such regulations. Rather, it merely
assumed that such power exists.24 The Court did, however, explicitly
acknowledge that many regulations enacted pursuant to section 602
prohibit activities permissible under section 601, namely neutral
policies with disparate effects. 25 Thus, under the Court's reasoning,
"discrimination" means intentional discrimination in section 601 but
may include unintentional discrimination in section 602.26 Despite
this apparent inconsistency, the Court only addressed whether an
implied private right of action exists to enforce the regulations
promulgated under section 602.27
The remaining issue not directly addressed in Sandoval is how
the regulations enacted under section 602 relate to section 601 when
they proscribe activities that are also impermissible under section 601.
Sandoval, read narrowly and only for its holding, does not necessarily
reach those regulations. Sandoval states that the purpose of section
602 is to effectuate the "rights already created by [section] 601. ' 2' s
This implementation by federal agencies is particularly necessary in
light of the inherent ambiguity of section 601.219 The language of

21. Id. at 289.
22. Other plaintiffs could be left in similar situations. For instance, non-English
speaking or limited English proficiency students could face serious problems from the
disparate effect of schools that do not choose to accommodate them with bilingual
education programs. For a discussion of how racial minorities may suffer in education, see
infra pages 388-89.
23. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82.
25. Id.
26. The Court recognizes this inconsistency in a footnote, writing, "[H]ow strange it is
to say that disparate-impact regulations are 'inspired by, at the service of, and inseparably
intertwined with' § 601 ...when § 601 permits the very behavior that the regulations
forbid." Id. at 286 n.6.
27. Id. at 279.
28. Id. at 289.
29. As stated by the Ninth Circuit in Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District,
158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998), "[t]he term 'discrimination' as used in Title VI is, of course,
notoriously ambiguous, generating more than thirty years of litigation over its precise
meaning." In GuardiansAss'n v. Civil Service Commission of New York, 463 U.S. 582
(1983), Justice White wrote, "The language of Title VI on its face is ambiguous; the word
'discrimination' is inherently so." Id. at 592.
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section 601 establishes a general right and principle and then leaves
its effectuation to federal agencies. Because agencies such as the
Department of Education are charged with enforcing Title VI, their
interpretation of sections 601 and 602 should be given great deference
so long as it is reasonable and does not conflict with congressional
intent. 30 The Ninth Circuit relied on this principle in Monteiro v.
Tempe Union High School District,31 extending the rule from Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council" that affords
deference to agency interpretations.3 3 Prior to Monteiro, no court had
held that student-on-student racial harassment was a Title VI
Instead, the court deferred to the Department of
violation.
Education, which had previously warned districts that in certain
Discrimination can encompass or exclude various activities, including animus,
disparate impact, racial goals, balancing, quotas, stereotypes, and improper use of
discretion. Whether one or more of these types of discrimination is included in the
Supreme Court's definition of "discrimination" has changed through the years. See
generally David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessness
in the Constitutional Racial Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 285 (1998)
(providing a history of discrimination jurisprudence); Christopher E. Smith, Race-ing into
the Twenty-First Century: The Supreme Court and the (E)quality of Justice, 28 U. TOL. L.
REV. 279 (1997) (describing the changes in the Supreme Court's notions of
discrimination). Further complicating the issue is the fact that four different major federal
laws prohibit racial discrimination: the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV; Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 2000d; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 2000e. The meaning of
discrimination may vary within each law. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (finding that plaintiffs suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 must demonstrate that an application of a particular employment practice created
disparate impact, and when the employer claims the employment practice is justified, the
dispositive issue is whether the challenged practice serves the legitimate employment goals
of the employer); Guardians,463 U.S. at 593 (stating that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 reaches unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination as well as deliberate racial
discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976) (holding that standards
applicable to equal employment opportunity cases should not have been applied in
resolving the issue of whether a qualifying test administered to applicants for police
officers violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment). For a while, section 601
of Title VI was thought to define discrimination differently than the Fourteenth
Amendment, but in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the
Court held that the two were co-extensive. Id. at 281-87. Regulations under section 602,
however, define a broader range of activities as falling within the meaning of
discrimination, including discriminatory effects. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(2)(b) (2001)
(prohibiting discriminatory effects in education). It was unclear until Sandoval whether
the Court recognized section 602's definition as being privately actionable. The ultimate
problem with defining discrimination may simply be that it occurs within an "indefinite
variety of contexts." Crump, supra, at 288 n.il.
30. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
31. 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998).
32. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
33. Id. at 842-45.
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circumstances they could be liable for such harassment under nondiscrimination laws.34 The Supreme Court has never explicitly stated

that the reasoning of Chevron extends to agency regulations and
guidelines such as those of the Department of Education regulations,
but it is implicit and almost a prerequisite to the Court's holdings in
two key cases, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District5 and
36
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.
In those cases, the

issue was whether sexual harassment was discrimination under Title
IX and whether a federal fund recipient could be held liable for
sexual harassment committed by third parties.
Gebser was the first Supreme Court case to hold that a school
could be held liable for sexual harassment not directly committed by
the institution or its officers.37 Gebser established standards by which
a school can be held liable for sexual harassment of which it has
knowledge and the authority to correct.38 A crucial issue in Gebser
was what circumstances are deemed to give the school knowledge or
place it on notice of inappropriate behavior.39 In Davis, the Court
further suggested what constitutes notice by favorably citing Office
for Civil Rights ("OCR") guidelines that informed school districts
that they might be liable for certain types of behavior." In this area
of the law, sexual harassment in the workplace already was
established as discrimination,41 but the importance of the OCR
guidelines is that they further delineate the boundaries of Title IX
and establish what is or is not a Title IX violation by informing
schools that things such as sexual harassment in education are also
prohibited. Implicit in the Court's holding was that OCR regulations
that include sexual harassment within the ambit of Title IX
discrimination do so correctly, and thus notify schools that sexual

34. Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1.032-33 ("We are aware of no reported decision addressing
the circumstances under which a school district's failure to respond to racial harassment
...by other students constitutes a violation of Title VI. However, the Department of
Education in 1994 interpreted Title VI as prohibiting student-to-student racial harassment
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

524 U.S. 274 (1998).
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-92.
Id. at 288-89.
Id.
Davis, 526 U.S. at 647-48 (citing Department of Education, Office for Civil

Rights, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL
EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12039-40 (Mar.

13, 1997)).
41. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-69 (1986).

2002]

SANDOVAL AND DISPARATE IMPACT

harassment is a Title IX violation.4" Working from this framework,
the only real question at issue was whether this harassment would
sustain a private right of action.43 Again the Court referred to OCR
guidelines as a means of making districts aware that they may incur
liability." These cases suggest, in fact, that an agency's regulatory
authority holds sway in defining discrimination and placing recipients
on notice. Sandoval does not necessarily undermine this principle.

Its holding was merely that Title VI regulations cannot create a
private right of action to enforce rights that are outside the scope of
section 601. 45
Although Sandoval does not completely undermine section 602
regulations, it does cloud their legal authority in the courts. Now that

an implied private cause of action does not exist to enforce section
602 regulations, 4 the meaning of these regulations is far from clear.47

Only further litigation and court decisions, or new legislation by
Congress, will settle the matter. Until the Supreme Court or
Congress speaks further on this issue, plaintiffs should bring claims
that build on causes of action previously established by the Court in
relevant contexts. Thus, the remainder of this Comment discusses
what avenues still may remain for plaintiffs after Sandoval.
II. ENFORCING TITLE VI REGULATIONS THROUGH 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Prior to Sandoval, several circuits had permitted individuals to
enforce Title VI regulations through private rights of action by
asserting that regulations create "rights" within the meaning of 42

42. Sandoval did not alter federal agencies' ability to enact regulations and enforce
them. Thus, agencies such as OCR can continue to define discrimination for themselves
and impose these definitions on recipients. This power and active stance has been
important in the sexual harassment context and can also play a similar role in other areas.
For any possibility of continued private causes of action for disparate impacts to exist,
federal agencies such as OCR must publicize interpretations of what constitutes Title VI
violations and make it clear that some disparate impacts continue to be impermissible.
Without such interpretations, those guilty of racially disparate impacts will have no clear
notice that their actions are Title VI violations. Thus, plaintiffs will have greater difficulty
asserting private causes of action.
43. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
44. 526 U.S. at 647-48.
45. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,293 (2001).
46. Id.
47. Whether section 602 regulations have force of law, fall within the meaning of
§ 1983, further define the term "discrimination," can be used to support different causes of
action, or are nothing more than the contract conditions for the receipt of federal funds
that can only be enforced by federal agencies, is uncertain. Id. at 288-89.
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U.S.C. § 1983.48 Section 1983 provides a private right of action for

individuals who have been deprived of a right under the federal
constitution or laws.49

Thus, after Sandoval, many civil rights advocates looked to
§ 1983 with hope that it could sustain causes of action for Title VI
regulation violations."
Shortly before the publication of this
Comment, however, the Supreme Court in Gonzaga University v.
Doe51 delivered a decision in regard to § 1983 that greatly damages
these hopes. The case involved a plaintiff's attempt to assert a Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) claim under § 1983.52
One could argue that Gonzaga is not directly controlling on a Title VI

inquiry. In fact, the Court distinguished Title VI from FERPA,
stating that unlike Title VI, Congress expressed no intent for any type
of cause of action under FERPA 3 Notwithstanding this distinction,
when Sandoval and Gonzaga are read together, it seems likely the
Court would not permit a cause of action to enforce Title VI
disparate impact regulations under § 1983. Gonzaga explicitly
reinterprets or modifies a core § 1983 test discussed in the following
Section, blurring the distinctions between an implied cause of action

and a § 1983 claim.54 Thus, from a practical standpoint, pursuing a
disparate impact claim under § 1983 may be an exercise in futility.
Despite this recent development, this Comment will discuss the
theories behind § 1983 claims, as some advocates are still pursuing
them and a few lower courts may remain receptive.

48. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 501-07 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd, Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (permitting a private cause of action to enforce Title VI
regulations); Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 397-400 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing a private
cause of action to enforce Title VI regulations under both the regulations themselves and
§ 1983); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996) (permitting a private right
of action under Title VI implementing regulations); N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New
York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) (permitting a disparate impact claim under Title
VI regulations); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 827-29 (7th Cir. 1995)
(recognizing a private right of action under Title VI implementing regulations). The Third
Circuit, however, has since changed its stance to prohibit such a claim. See S. Camden
Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790-91 (3d Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
50. Since Sandoval, plaintiffs have relied on this theory in several cases. For examples
of how plaintiffs may rely on Sandoval, see Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir.
2002); S. Camden, 274 F.3d 771.
51. 122 S.Ct. 2268 (2002).
52. Id. at 2271.
53. Id. at 2277.
54. Id. at 2275 (writing that the two tests "overlap in one meaningful respect-in
either case we must first determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right").
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South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of
55 a district court decision, was the first case
Environmental Protection,
to address this issue post-Sandoval. The court in South Camden
asserted that Sandoval only addressed the narrow issue of whether a
private right of action is implied in section 602.56 Because the § 1983
issue was not before the Supreme Court and nothing in its holding
precluded recognizing the right under § 1983, the district court
asserted that its circuit's prior holding permitting a § 1983 suit to
enforce Title VI regulations is still binding." The Third Circuit,

however, reversed the district court, finding that the implications of
Sandoval preclude a § 1983 claim.58 Conversely and even more
recently, the Tenth Circuit held that § 1983 claims still may be
sustained post-Sandoval.9 How the remaining circuits will interpret
Sandoval is unsettled, but the following Section outlines the relevant

Supreme Court precedent that should control their analysis, reviews
how the circuits have previously approached the question, and
suggests how the Supreme Court might ultimately decide the matter.
A.

Regulatory Law and § 1983 Causes of Action

Circuits have allowed a private right of action to enforce Title VI
regulations under § 1983 by applying Supreme Court precedent that
suggested the test that applies to § 1983 causes of action is a different
inquiry than that of implied rights of action under other statutes.60
Because the Sandoval and Gonzaga Court did not consider whether a
plaintiff might use § 1983 to privately enforce section 602, some
55. 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S.Ct. 2621 (2002).
56. Id. at 517.
57. Id. at 518. In Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit permitted a disparate impact cause of action to move
forward on two different theories: implied cause of action and § 1983. Id. at 397-400.
Because Sandoval only expressly overruled the implied cause of action, the court in South
Camden asserted it was still bound by the remaining portion of Powell's holding. S.
Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
58. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790-91
(3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2621 (2002).
59. Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002). Speaking of Sandoval, the
Tenth Circuit stated, "The Court's decision does not bar all claims to enforce such
regulations, but only disparate impact claims brought by private parties directly under
Title VI. Disparate impact claims may still be brought against state officials for
prospective injunctive relief through an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce section
602 regulations." Id. at 1187.
60. Mank, supra note 14, at 357. The Gonzaga Court continued to recognize that a
different test applies to § 1983, but found that the test is largely the same as that in an
implied cause of action. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002).
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circuits that have recognized a private cause of action under § 1983
might continue to do so.6' Unlike section 602, § 1983 clearly creates a
cause of action.6 2 In § 1983, the issue is not whether a cause of action

exists, but whether the federal regulation creates a "right" that falls
within the meaning of § 1983.63 This is a particularly important
distinction because an implied right of action requires congressional
intent,64 whereas § 1983 does not because the right already has been
created.65

In 1871, when Congress first enacted § 1983, the statute only
protected rights that were secured under the Constitution,66 but three
years later, the statute was amended to also encompass violations of
federal laws that create private rights.67

The test for determining

whether a federal law creates a "right" that falls within the scope of
§ 1983 was established in Blessing v. Freestone.68 First, Congress must
69
have intended that the statute in question benefit the plaintiff.
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right protected by the
statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would

strain judicial competence. 7° Last, the statute must unambiguously
impose a binding obligation on the states.71 The Gonzaga Court
stated that it was not changing the Blessing test, but Gonzaga stressed
that Congress must intend to create a federal right, not merely intend

61. In fact, Justice Stevens in dissent stated Sandoval was merely an exercise in
mental gymnastics because a cause of action is still available under § 1983. Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 299-300 (2001).
62. "Any person in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, who has been
deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
63. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990).
64. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1974).
65. Mank, supra note 14, at 357-58.
66. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871.) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
67. Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983:
The Supreme Court's Failureto Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 283, 304-05 (1996). For further discussion of the history of the change and
scholarly debate of whether and how the amendment changed the statute, see Mank,
supra note 14, at 327-29.
68. 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). An example of a right that conforms to Blessing is
the right to be free from intentional racial discrimination in federally funded programs.
Thus, one can sue to prevent racial discrimination by private universities if they receive
federal funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
69. Id. at 340.
70. Id. at 340-41 (quoting Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth.,
479 U.S. 418, 431 (1987)).
71. Id. at 341.
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the statute to benefit the plaintiff.7 2 Thus, courts must apply the
Blessing test more rigorously now and refrain from finding a § 1983
cause of action when Congress intends "anything short of an
unambiguously conferred right."73
The courts are divided as to how regulatory laws factor into the
Blessing analysis and whether they are "laws" that create rights as
contemplated in § 1983. The circuits have yet to readdress this issue
since Gonzaga. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,74 the Supreme Court established that if Congress enacts
a statute that is vague or silent on certain issues and leaves regulatory
authority to an agency, the agency's interpretation of the statute
should be given considerable deference.75 But when the statute is not
vague or the agency goes "beyond mere interpretation and essentially
72. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002).
73. Id.
74. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
75. Id. at 843-44; Mank, supra note 14, at 340. During this term, the Supreme Court
further defined the standards of Chevron in United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164
(2001). In Mead, the Court held "that administrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority." Id. at 2171. Although some commentators interpret Mead as undermining
Chevron, it may have merely been a restatement of Chevron that more clearly explained
what Chevron did not sanction. See, e.g., Thomas W. Kirby, Toppling Rules? Supreme
Court Makes Agency Decisions More Vulnerable, 165 N.J. L. J. 593 (2001) (arguing that
Mead undermined the deference principle of Chevron). Any pessimistic view of Mead
probably results from a prior willingness to interpret Chevron overexpansively. Some
litigants used Chevron as precedent to afford a general deference to agency activities,
determinations, and policies across the board, but the language of Chevron was not so
definite as to provide sound support for such agency deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843-44 (stating that a court may not substitute its construction for the agency's when
"Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill [because] there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation."). The Court in Mead created a sound foundation under those regulations
authorized by Congress. This foundation was not necessarily created by Chevron, but was
rather only assumed by Chevron's interpreters. See Kirby, supra, at 593. Mead stated that
when Congress expressly delegates authority to an agency to enforce a statute through
regulation, the regulation is binding in the courts "unless procedurally defective, arbitrary
or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2171.
Essentially, Mead still acknowledged that "considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."
Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). These reiterations of Chevron in Mead are the
core of Chevron. All that Mead added to the central aspects of Chevron was the
explanation that agency interpretations expressed through letters, guidelines, policy
statements, and other materials do not have force of law and are not to be used as
definitive authority. See id. at 2174-75. If such statements by the Supreme Court have
changed the way agencies operate or are viewed, it is only because Chevron was
improperly being relied on before.
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exercises lawmaking authority in promulgating a regulation that
creates rights that are not apparent in the governing statute," then the
courts have divided over whether agency regulations alone may

create "rights" enforceable under § 1983.76
The Supreme Court faced this issue in GuardiansAss'n v. Civil
Service Commission of New York77 but failed to resolve it because the
decision was splintered with no majority opinion.7 8 Following

Guardianswas a line of Supreme Court cases involving § 1983 claims
and federal regulations but none of these cases spoke definitively on
whether regulations alone can establish rights.7 9 Although it is not
entirely clear, these cases appear to recognize primary "rights" when
the regulation works in conjunction with a statute.8° For example,
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority8

involved United States Housing and Urban Development regulations,
which the Court held helped define a vague statute and further
establish a federal right.82 This decision was followed by Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital Ass'n83 in which the Court again stated that federal
regulations may help define a statutory right. 84 These cases suggest

that section 602 regulations also might define a statutory right and
thus be actionable under § 1983. The circuits have yet to uniformly
conclude this, however, and Gonzaga calls into question the propriety
of doing so.8
76. Mank, supra note 14, at 340.
77. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
78. Five different opinions were written. Five judges concurred in the opinion, but no
opinion garnered more than three votes. The Court was divided over what standard of
proof is necessary "to prove violations of rights in cases involving Title VI." Id. at 608 n.1.
For further discussion of the case, see Patricia Kines, Intent to Discriminateand Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Lau, Bakke, and Guardians, 17 EDUC. L. REP. 443, 447-49
(1984).
79. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (stating that the Court
would not find that Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement unless Congress
affirmatively withdrew the private remedy); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (finding that the availability of § 1983 remedies "turns on
whether the statute ...creates obligations 'sufficiently specific and definite' to be within
the 'competence of the judiciary to enforce.' "); Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (holding that § 1983 generally
establishes a cause of action to enforce violations of federal law unless the defendant can
show that Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement).
80. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 511.
81. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
82. Id. at 431-32.
83. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
84. Id. at 511.
85. Gonzaga did not address the issue of how regulations factor into this analysis, but
it appears to realign the Wilder cases. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002)
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Circuit Split: Can Regulations Independently Create a § 1983
Right?

The circuits interpret the Wilder line of cases differently. Several
circuits have read these cases to stand for the principle that federal
regulations can create federal § 1983 rights if they meet a three-prong
test described in Blessing.8 6 In Powell v. Ridge,8" the Third Circuit
squarely addressed this issue as it relates to Title VI. The court held
that administrative regulations prohibiting disparate impact could be
enforced under § 1983.88 Prior to Powell, the Third Circuit had also
stated that "valid federal regulations as well as federal statutes may
create rights enforceable under section 1983. "89 Similarly, the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits essentially have concluded that regulations may
create independent rights that are enforceable under § 1983.90
Other circuits, however, have taken a more restrictive posture
toward agency regulations. They have couched the § 1983 issue in
terms of whether the regulation has the "force and effect of law."91
Thus, the "force and effect" test, as set out in Chrysler Corp v.
Brown,92 of whether Congress has mandated that the agency enact
regulations would control.93 If Congress has mandated such, the
(rejecting previous interpretations of the Wilder cases). In fact, the Gonzaga Court stated
that one of the purposes of its decisions was to clear up the confusions surrounding these
cases. Id. Because of the recent nature of Gonzaga, however, the lower courts have yet to
interpret it in relation to regulations. For this reason, the remainder of this Section of the
Comment will concentrate on the circuits' previously prevailing views on the matter.
86. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text; Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,
340-41 (1997) (finding that the three factors to be considered are whether Congress
intended the provision to benefit the plaintiff, whether the right is not so vague as to strain
judicial competence, and whether the statute unambiguously imposes a binding obligation
on the states); see, e.g., Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190-92 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that regulations accompanying an act create enforceable rights under § 1983);
Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551-53 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying the test
developed in Blessing and reiterated in Wilder); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885
F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989) affd, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (finding that "valid federal regulations
as well as federal statutes may create rights enforceable under section 1983").
87. 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999).
88. Id. at 401-03.
89. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 885 F.2d at 18.
90. Buckley, 66 F.3d at 190-92; Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551-53.
91. See Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing the
"force and effect" standard articulated in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302
(1979)); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 724 n.19 (10th Cir.
1988) (citing Samuels as an example of § 1983 suit based on violation of rights under
federal regulations).
92. 441 U.S. 281, 301-303 (1979) (noting that a regulation has the "force and effect" of
law when it is created in response to congressional legislation and it affects the rights and
obligations of individuals).
93. Id.
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regulations are generally considered to have force of law and
consequently are enforceable under § 1983. 91 At least in relation to
Title VI, it should make little difference whether a circuit takes this
approach or the prior one because section 602 establishes a
Congressional mandate for agencies to pass regulations to further
section 601, 95 which means section 602 regulations have the "force
and effect of law," and thus the power to establish rights for § 1983
purposes.
Under either the Third Circuit's or the "force and effect of law"
approach, once a plaintiff establishes that a federal law creates a

distinct "right," the Blessing analysis establishes a presumption that
the right is enforceable under § 1983.96 Then the burden shifts to the
defendant to show either that Congress explicitly prohibited such a
right from being actionable under § 1983 or that Congress implicitly
intended to preclude the action by creating a remedial scheme so
comprehensive that a cause of action under § 1983 would be

incompatible with it.97 For example, some courts have concluded that
Title VII's remedial scheme for employment discrimination provides
so many procedures and administrative adjudications that a private
right of action is unnecessary and would only disrupt the process. 98 In
contrast, those circuits concluding that section 602 creates "rights"
also conclude that Title VI's administrative procedures are not so
comprehensive as to preclude a private right of action under § 1983. 9
94. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000) (authorizing agencies to issue rules and regulations to
further the objectives of such agencies). Title VI is a condition on federal funds. In
exchange for federal funds, Congress expects recipients to comply with Title VI's nondiscrimination principles. Id. § 2000d. Furthermore, Congress expects those federal
agencies distributing funds to enact regulations to ensure that the recipients are not
discriminating. Id. § 2000d-1. Thus, a circuit requiring that regulations have force and
effect of law to be cognizable under § 1983 should also include Title VI regulations within
§ 1983's scope.
96. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997).
97. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994); W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885
F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Lisa L. Frye, Note, Suter v. Artist M. and Statutory
Remedies Under Section 1983: Alteration Without Justification, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1170,
1181-82 (1993) (stating that Congress' preclusion of a § 1983 action may be implied from
comprehensive remedies provided under a statute).
98. See Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985). Congress
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for the specific purpose of
evaluating and remedying Title VII employment discrimination claims and remedies must
be exhausted there before bringing a claim in court. § 2000e-4. Thus, the Alexander court
found that Congress clearly intended to preclude a private cause of action when it created
the administrative remedies for Title VII. Alexander, 773 F.2d at 856.
99. See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 401-02 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that Title VI
did not establish an "elaborate procedural mechanism" for the protection of individual
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Circuits are reluctant to preclude § 1983 actions based on finding an
implied intent because on only two occasions has the Supreme Court
found remedial schemes to be so comprehensive that they negate the
viability of a § 1983 claim.100 In both instances, the statute in question
provided the plaintiffs with extensive statutory remedies,1"' unlike
Title VI, which does not create a specific remedial scheme for private
plaintiffs, but only authorizes agencies to terminate funds to
recipients who violate Title VI. °2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
in other cases has emphasized that "a plaintiff's ability to invoke
§ 1983 cannot be defeated simply by '[t]he availability of
administrative mechanisms to protect the plaintiff's interests.' "103
The specifics of Title VI's administrative remedies only further
the argument that they do not preclude a § 1983 cause of action. As a
general matter, the administrative remedies of Title VI do not
operate to protect or vindicate the individual rights of potential
Individuals who issue Title VI complaints with
plaintiffs."0 '
administrative agencies do not have a right to participate in the
administrative resolution of the complaint."0 Although the agency
has discretion to permit the participation, the complaint becomes
essentially one of agency concern, with the agency's objective being
future compliance with the regulations and not necessarily the
rights). The only formal procedures for enforcing Title VI are notifying the recipient of
the violation, holding a hearing, giving him the opportunity to voluntarily comply, and
then after Congressional approval, halting the recipient's funding in the particular
program against which it has discriminated. See § 2000d-1. In contrast, Title VII created
the EEOC, the agency with which plaintiffs must file employment discrimination claims.
After a claim is filed, the EEOC notifies the defendant of the complaint, investigates the
claim, and determines whether there is probable cause for the claim. Id. § 2000e-5(b). If
the EEOC finds such probable cause, it takes steps to eliminate the discrimination and
makes formal findings on the claim. Id.
100. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010-11 (1984) (characterizing the
administrative procedures as "elaborate" and stating that because Congress established
protections for the benefit of the plaintiff class, it did not intend to create any other
private causes of action); Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1981) (characterizing the remedial scheme as "unusually elaborate"
because it provided the government and private individuals with a cause of action with
both criminal and civil penalties).
101. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1010-11 (evaluating the Education of the Handicapped
Act); Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13-14 (analyzing the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act).
102. See § 2000d-1 (stating compliance may be effectuated by "termination of or
refusal to grant" financial assistance).
103. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 347 (1997) (quoting Golden State Transit
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103,106 (1989)).
104. Mank, supra note 14, at 363-64 (outlining the limited rights available to
complainants due to the nature of Title VI investigation procedures and remedies).
105. Id. at 363.
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remedying of individual harms. °6 Second, the resolution of a Title VI
complaint may persist for several years, with the complainant having
no real input into the process.0 7 Third, if the complainant is
dissatisfied with the agency's resolution, the complainant has no
formal right to challenge the resolution." 8 Last, the only remedy
available to an agency that cannot get compliance from a recipient is
to cut the recipient's funding, which agencies are reluctant to do. 109
By contrast, a private cause of action provides a complainant with
personal participation, an appeals process, and a full array of
remedies."0 Only the Seventh Circuit has found that Title VI's
administrative procedures preclude a § 1983 action,"' and this
conclusion is not well founded in light of the Supreme Court's stance
that such preclusions are limited to very exceptional cases." 2 Thus, it
seems unlikely that Title VI's administrative enforcement would
interfere with the availability of a § 1983 claim.
Unlike any of the circuits that permit § 1983 claims for violations
of federal regulations, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits explicitly
reject the notion that regulations independently can create rights that
are actionable under § 1983.113 Their position is that federal rights
only come from "explicit or implicit statutory requirements. 1' 4
Therefore, regulations that go beyond the statutory requirements
cannot create rights enforceable under § 1983.115 In Harris v. James, 16
the Eleventh Circuit argued that the Supreme Court did not hold in
Wright that a regulation alone could create a federal right, and thus
the court should adopt the fallback position that requires a finding of
congressional intent to create a right." 7 The Eleventh Circuit further
suggested that Supreme Court precedent only implied that if a statute
itself creates a specific right, a regulation enacted under it could
106. See id.
107. Id. at 363-64.
108. Id. at 364.
109. 40 C.F.R. § 7.130 (1999).
110. Mank, supra note 14, at 364-65.
111. Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985) (summarily
finding that Title VI's enforcement procedures were sufficient and "would be bypassed by
pleading Title VI violations under § 1983").
112. Mank, supra note 14, at 325-26.
113. Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008-09 (11th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d
980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987).
114. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009 n.21.
115. A regulation may serve as the basis of a § 1983 suit only if there is an appropriate
"nexus between the right in the regulation and congressional intent" to establish an
enforceable federal right in the statute that authorized the regulation. Id. at 1010.
116. 127 F.3d 993, 1008-09 (11th Cir. 1997).
117. Id. at 1008.
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"further define" or "flesh out the content of that right."'1 8 Under this
interpretation, a right is created only when Congress clearly intends
to create a right, but leaves the definition of the right or its contours
ambiguous. In such a case, the authorized agency regulations could
serve as a mechanism to further define the right." 9 Essentially,
although the regulations cannot create rights, "courts often recognize
that regulations can play a role in interpreting and explicating rights
implicit in an underlying statute.' 12° Yet in the end, it is the courts,
not the agency, that decide whether an agency's interpretation is
accurate or authorized.
C. Sandoval's Impact on the Viability of § 1983 claims
The district court in South Camden Citizens in Action v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection2' was the first court
to consider a private cause of action for section 602 after the Sandoval
ruling. The South Camden court allowed plaintiffs, who were victims
of a racially disparate impact, to proceed with their suit, reasoning
that Sandoval does not expressly prohibit a cause of action under
§ 1983.122 The court is technically correct because the Sandoval Court
did not address § 1983. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Sandoval
explicitly stated that only its holdings, not its dicta, bind subsequent
courts. 23 Because no prior Supreme Court decision had ever strictly
held that a private right of action existed under section 602, Sandoval
found that language suggesting otherwise was only dicta.'24 Thus, the
district court in South Camden held Sandoval to its own principle and
refused to prohibit a § 1983 cause of action under section 602
regulations merely because of dicta or suggestive reasoning in
25

Sandoval.1

26
In a split decision, the Third Circuit reversed the district court.
Unlike the district court, the split-panel's decision was based in

118. Id. at 1008-09.
119. See id.
120. Mank, supra note 14, at 348.
121. 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002).
122. Id. at 518.
123. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282-84 (2000).
124. Id. The Sandoval Court stated that nothing in Bakke, Guardian's,or Cannon v.
Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979), supported a private cause of action for section
602 disparate impact regulations. Rather, all three cases either required or were premised
on a finding of intentional discrimination. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282-86.
125. S. Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
126. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N. J. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790-91 (3d
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002).
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principal part upon what Sandoval implied, rather than what it held. 27
Recognizing this, the Tenth Circuit also found Sandoval did not
prohibit a § 1983 claim.'28 When the implications of Sandoval are
considered in conjunction with Gonzaga, however, the Third Circuit
appears to have correctly forecast the Supreme Court's position.
Gonzaga focuses on congressional intent to create a right, which is
the support Sandoval also found lacking in section 602.129
Thus, although the district court's and the Tenth Circuit's
decisions appeared wise at the time, subsequent developments appear
to undermine their position. The Gonzaga Court has effectively
conflated the § 1983 test with the test for establishing an implied
private cause of action. 3 ' Despite the Supreme Court's statements in
Wilder that the test for determining whether a plaintiff can bring a
§ 1983 claim is different than the test for whether Congress created an
independent cause of action in a statute,'

the Gonzaga Court stated,

"our implied right of action cases should guide the determination of
whether a statute confers rights enforceable

under § 1983.132

Consequently, the inconsistency between § 1983 and implied causes
of action that
once troubled commentators seems to have
33
disappeared.

1

127. Judge Greenberg, writing for the split-panel, found that the trial court had made
errors of law. Id. at 782-84. He asserted that the trial court overread Powell v. Ridge as
permitting a § 1983 claim to enforce a Title VI violation. Id. at 784-85. Instead, he argued
that Powell only assumed such a cause of action. Id. Thus, he essentially addressed the
issue as a matter of first impression in light of the Sandoval decision. He relied on
Sandoval's ultimate conclusion-that no Congressional intent exists to create a section 602
right for the purposes of an independent private cause of action-to conclude that
Congress did not intend to create a right in section 602 for the purposes of § 1983. Id. at
788-90. Furthermore, -because section 602 regulations prohibit disparate impact, they go
beyond the meaning of the specific rights in section 601 and thus are unenforceable under
§ 1983. Id. at 790. In sum, federal regulations alone cannot create enforceable rights and
Congress did not intend to create a right to be free from disparate impact. Id. at 790-91.
The dissent, however, argued that the majority approached the case incorrectly and that
the Circuit's prior decision in Powell v. Ridge was controlling. Id. at 791 (McKee, J.,
dissenting). Prior to most recent South Camden case, Powell had not been overruled and
the majority here only overrules Powell by overreading Sandoval. Id.
128. See Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that § 1983
claims still may be sustained post-Sandoval).
129. Compare Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2275-77 (2002), with Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-88 (2001).
130. Gonzaga, 122 S.Ct. at 2286 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating this decision "blurs
the long-recognized distinction between rights and remedies").
131. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990).
132. Gonzaga, 122 S.Ct. at 2275.
133. See Mank, supra note 14, at 359 (citing Henry Paul Monaghan, FederalStatutory
Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 247 (1991)); Michael A.
Mazzuchi, Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies, and
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This anomaly, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, began long
ago in Wilder. Finding it unacceptable to recognize a cause of action
under § 1983 when the statute in question did not create its own, he
dissented. 34 He essentially argued that the very fact that the statute
does not confer a cause of action shows that Congress did not intend
to confer a substantive right to benefit a plaintiff class.' 35 He stated
that "for relief to be had either under § 1983 or by implication under
Cort v. Ash, the language used by Congress must confer identifiable
'
Thus, if a statutory provision does not rise to
enforceable rights."136
the level of creating an enforceable right, neither does it create a
cause of action under § 1983.137
The Court in Gonzaga asserted that it has now cleared the
confusion surrounding the Wilder line of cases.138 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's authorship of the majority opinion in Gonzaga, however,
is telling, as his twelve-year wait to have his view predominate has
ended with his former dissent becoming the opinion of the Court.
But rather than overruling precedent, the Gonzaga Court redefines
the Wilder line of cases, leaving its distinct § 1983 test's terms intact
while changing their substance. 39
Now, including section 602 within the scope of § 1983 causes of
action appears to counter new Supreme Court precedent. 4 ° The
assumptions and interpretations that serve as the foundation for a
§ 1983 argument were made prior to Sandoval and Gonzaga. But
these cases are not a complete surprise, as Bradford Mank wrote,

Realism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1062, 1109 (1992) (arguing it is inconsistent to permit a cause
of action under § 1983).
134. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 525-27 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 527 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 526 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (citing Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
137. Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument appears to be circular. Instead of applying the
three-part test to determine whether a right is created within § 1983, he looks at the test
for determining whether an implied cause of action is created in the law in question. Thus,
if there is an implied cause of action contained in the law, then it creates a right
enforceable by § 1983, and vice versa. However, if he were in fact correct, § 1983 would be
virtually useless because it would only provide causes of action for those plaintiffs who
already have causes of action, and it would not offer any relief to those who did not have
an independent cause of action.
138. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002).
139. Id. at 2275-76 (retaining the Blessing methodology while focusing on the issue of
rights-creating language and intentions, which were not contained in the original test). In
his dissent, Justice Stevens concludes that the Court has done "nothing to clarify... § 1983
jurisprudence" and has only made things worse by shifting a burden to the plaintiff that
was once on the defendant. Id. at 2285-86.
140. See supra notes 51-54.
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"There is a significant possibility that the Supreme Court could reject
a private right of action under Title VI's regulations ....141
Prior to Sandoval, the possibility always existed that the Supreme
Court simply might find that there was no congressional intent to
create a private right of action under section 602.142 Now, with the
Court's decisions in Sandoval and Gonzaga, the arguments against
enforcing Title VI regulations through § 1983 appear to be stacked
too high. The old assumption was that a decision denying an implied
cause of action would not affect § 1983 claims. The Court's reasoning
in Sandoval, however, has heavy implications in the § 1983 context,
particularly after Gonzaga. In Sandoval, the Court made explicit
distinctions between sections 601 and 602,143 finding an implied cause
of action exists under section 601 but not under section 602.1' The
Court characterized section 602 as merely an extension of section 601,
and thus section 602 cannot create any rights not already
encompassed by section 601.145 Therefore, section 602 regulations
that prohibit disparate effects, which could be unintentional, attempt
to create rights not contained in section 601. The Court assumed
without holding, however, that promulgating such regulations under
section 602 is within a federal agency's authority, 46 but the very fact
that the Court found that the regulations go beyond section 601 was
the implicit reason why it concluded Congress did not intend to create
a private right of action under section 602. Thus, it is unlikely that the
Court would find that section 602 creates a "right" for purposes of
§ 1983 while not creating an independent right in section 602. As the
Court in Gonzaga stated, this lack of intent also will guide the Court's
inquiry under § 1983,'14 and most likely will prove to be the end of
attempts to enforce Title VI regulations through § 1983.
III.

ENFORCING TITLE VI REGULATIONS THROUGH DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Those advocates who wish to resurrect a private cause of action
for disparate impact have a much better chance of success with a
theory predicated on deliberate indifference. The Court already has

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Mank, supra note 14, at 353.
Id.
532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001).
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id. at 281.
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002).
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implemented the "deliberate indifference" standard in Title IX 4 '
sexual harassment jurisprudence and might implement it to establish
a cause of action under the analogous Title VI. Most of the
jurisprudence on deliberate indifference originally derives from
§ 1983 claims, but the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District'4 9 extended the theory to the Title IX

context. 150 Now, deliberate indifference can be used to establish a
school system's culpability when it has not engaged in discrimination

itself, but when it is aware of discrimination that has been occurring
under its control and which it fails to remedy.' 5 ' Thus, by failing to
prevent or remedy sexual discrimination of which it is aware, a
recipient is, in a sense, the cause of the discrimination's continuation,
or effectively causes the discrimination. 5 2 There are four basic
elements of deliberate indifference: (1) there must be an official with
the authority and power to correct the discrimination; (2) the official
must be on notice that the recipient could be liable in the event that
certain misconduct occurred; (3) the official must have actual notice
of the misconduct; and (4) the official must be deliberately indifferent
to the violation of a victim's rights, misconduct, or discrimination. 5 '
154
The Ninth Circuit in Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District
also extended the deliberate indifference line of reasoning to Title VI
and thus placed a duty on schools to prevent student-on-student racial
harassment once a school becomes aware of a problem. 55

148. "Title IX" refers to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX,
Prohibition of Sex Discrimination, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373, 373-375 (1972)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)). Title IX prohibits gender discrimination
in federally funded educational programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). It operates in a
manner similar to Title VI and is enforced by OCR. Id.
149. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
150. Id. at 290-91.
151. Id. at 290. Title IX was modeled after Title VI, and many of the principles
developed in one of the areas are applicable to the other. The Supreme Court has
recognized the similarities between the two in rendering its decisions. See, e.g., id. at 287
(noting that the Court will scrutinize the propriety of private actions for monetary
damages in suits or noncompliance with Titles VI and IX); id. at 294 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (observing that by the time Title IX was passed, the Court already had
construed Title VI to contain a private remedy; therefore, Congress must have been aware
that by their repeated references to Title VI, similar remedies would be inferred from
Title IX); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) (stating that the Court has
no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX with the same right to private causes of
action as Title VI).
152. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999).
153. See id. at 644-47.
154. 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998).
155. Id. at 1034.
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The deliberate indifference framework is easily applied in the
racial and sexual harassment contexts because the harassment
generally evidences obvious regulation violations.
Applying
deliberate indifference becomes more complex in other situations.
Because deliberate indifference has been used only in harassment
cases, courts may hesitate to extend the concept to other types of
discrimination such as disparate impact. Some factors may make this
initial step problematic. First, the Court is well settled that sexual and
racial harassment rise to the level of discrimination and are thus
prohibited by Titles VI and IX. 56 Conversely, now that Sandoval has
brought the viability of disparate impact regulations promulgated
under section 602 into question by holding that they do not include a
private cause of action, discrimination cannot be as easily defined to
include policies that result in disparate impact.'57 Thus, policies with
disparate impact may not constitute a level of discrimination toward
which a school official could be indifferent.158 Second, because school
officials generally are the ones implementing the policies, one could
argue that they either enact them with discriminatory intent or they
do not.'59 Some might argue that if the recipient did not have
discriminatory intent upon enacting a policy, then the policy cannot
later be transformed into an intentionally discriminatory one. To
suggest that such recipients are deliberately indifferent to their own
unintentional action may stretch the concept beyond its definition.
Third, the Sandoval decision clouds the issue of liability, notice of
which is important in deliberate indifference cases. 16° The decision
makes it appear that recipients cannot be held privately liable in any
way for disparate impact policies. 161 This complicates the issue of
reestablishing liability because the Supreme Court in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman6 2 required that recipients of federal
156. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649-50.
157. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001). There is no single definition for
discrimination that persists throughout the law and historical jurisprudence, thus it is most
often the defining of the term that determines the outcomes of cases, and as of late, the
term has been consistently defined more narrowly. See supra note 29.
158. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 649-50 (requiring a clear definition of discrimination).
159. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 201 F.3d 388, 412-13 (5th Cir. 2000) (arguing that
deliberate indifference tests have little relevance in determining whether intentional
discrimination has occurred).
160. See supra notes 203-18 and accompanying text.
161. See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) (holding that an
examination of the text and structure of Title VI, especially the narrow scope of the
remedial scheme outlined in section 602, reveals no Congressional intent to create a
private right of action).
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funds be made unambiguously aware of potential liability. 163 Thus,

arguing that a recipient is aware of its liability after Sandoval may be
more difficult.
Furthermore, if section 602 disparate impact
regulations do not set a standard for or define discrimination,
notifying an official of the impact may not constitute notifying her of
"discrimination" that she would have a duty to remedy."6 Deliberate

indifference is conceptualized as deliberate indifference toward
rights. 65 If section 602 cannot create or define a right, then there is
nothing toward which a recipient could be deliberately indifferent.
The Sixth Circuit recognized this application problem in Homer
v. Kentucky High School Ass'n1 66 Homer involved a gender
disparate impact claim under Title IX. 167 Although the case was preSandoval, the claim was for monetary damages, and the court
required a showing of intentional discrimination. 68 Thus, as a
conceptual matter, Sandoval should not cast doubt on this court's

reasoning because it was not operating under the assumption that
unintentional discrimination alone would support a private cause of

action. The policy in question in Homer was facially neutral and was
162. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). In Pennhurst,a case involving a claim against a hospital under
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 104-183, § 1,
110 Stat. 1694, 1694 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1999)), repealed by
Pub. L. No. 106-402, § 401(a), 114 Stat. 1737, 1737 (2000), the Court held that the receipt
of funds alone did not expose the recipient to liability under the act. Pennhurst,451 U.S.
at 17-18. Rather, Congress must make it clear to the recipient that a condition on
receiving the funds is being liable for claims. Id.
163. Id. at 24-25.
164. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998), and
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), no question existed as
to whether sexual harassment was impermissible gender discrimination under Title IX.
The key issue was whether the school had notice of the harassment and the authority to
prevent it. If a school had notice and authority, then the school would know that it was in
violation of Title IX. However, if section 602 regulations do not set a standard for
"discrimination," it would be more difficult for a school to readily know that a disparate
impact is a violation of Title VI. Knowledge of a disparate impact alone might not be
notice of discrimination or a Title VI violation; it might merely be notice of a disparate
impact.
165. See generally City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (holding that
inadequate police training may be a basis for liability when it amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of people with whom the police interact).
166. 206 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000). Horner involved a
claim by female high school students against their school system, alleging that its failure to
sanction a fast-pitch softball team was a violation of the Equal Protection and Title IX. Id.
at 687.
167. Id. at 693.
168. Id. at 692. The plaintiffs were required to show intentional discrimination because
they asserted monetary damages. Id. at 692. They failed to allege intent, and the case was
dismissed on this basis. Id. at 693. This does not affect the court's theoretical discussion
about deliberate indifference, however.
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challenged on a disparate impact theory.169 The court, however, was
not clear on how to proceed because it stated that the only definite
17
test the Supreme Court has provided is "deliberate indifference.""
Furthermore, the deliberate indifference test was developed in the
sexual harassment context and is not directly transferable to other
contexts. 7' The Sixth Circuit explained that in the Supreme Court's
sexual harassment cases, "intent" is proven by " 'actual notice' of the
abuse by a third party and a failure to stop it."'72 The court then
discussed whether the proper analysis to apply to a facially neutral
law is one requiring "discriminatory animus" or "deliberate
indifference."' 7 3
In a footnote, the court argued that the
appropriateness of either test varies depending upon the facts of the
case."' The court stated that "a deliberate indifference test might be
appropriate when Plaintiffs claim that defendant school officials had
actual knowledge of the disparate impact of their policies, either at
the time of enactment or when subsequently brought to their
'
attention post-enactment, and turn a blind eye."175
On the other
hand, the court stated that there are times when a school adopts a
policy because of gender bias without knowing of its disparate
17 6
impact.
The Sixth Circuit, however, was not forced to adopt or apply
either test because the plaintiff failed "to establish a violation of Title
IX, let alone an intentional violation."' 77 Although the court did not
move forward on the disparate impact claim, implicit in the discussion
was the notion that a plaintiff can, in certain circumstances, sue under
a disparate impact theory.'7 8 The plaintiff would have to show the
disparate impact of a neutral regulation actually violated Title IX. 179
Such a violation could be established under Title IX's implementing
regulations and guidelines. 80 A violation of these regulations, in and
of itself, however, would not sustain a private right of action for
monetary damages because the initial violation may have been

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 693.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 693 n.4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 692-93.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 694.
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unintentional.18

Nevertheless, the requisite intent could be created

by a deliberate indifference to the Title IX violation. 82 Although the
school did not initially intend the Title IX violation, its failure to
correct the violation, or deliberate indifference, would suffice for

intent."s3 In such a circumstance, what was an unintentional disparate
impact would have risen to the level of a privately actionable
intentional Title IX violation.
A deliberate indifference theory structured in this way is equally
applicable to Title VI. 184
' Although Sandoval held that there was no

implied private right of action under section 602,185 the Court did not
question federal agencies' authority to enact disparate impact
regulations under it. 18 6 Thus, there would be no independent implied

private cause of action under section 602 for unintentional
discrimination with a disparate impact,187 but the disparate impact

would still be a Title VI violation, 8 which a federal agency could
prohibit and which a recipient would have a duty to correct once it
had notice of the violation.'89 Analogous to the Title IX argument
above, deliberate indifference to the violation would be equivalent to
intent and could give rise to a private cause of action.

181. Id.
182. Id. at 693 n.4.
183. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999) (holding that a
school could be liable for discriminatory acts it did not initially intend, but toward which it
was deliberately indifferent after becoming aware of them).
184. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984) (stating that the
congressional intent behind Titles VI and IX was the same). Although Grove City was
extracting from Title VI to Title IX, the reverse has also been done in other instances.
See, e.g., Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that when a school district is deliberately indifferent to an atmosphere of racial
hostility and discrimination, the district may be liable for damages under Title VI). In
Sandoval, the Supreme Court also reiterates that the Title IX cause of action
jurisprudence from Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), is applicable to
Title VI. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
185. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.
186. Id. at 281-82.
187. Id. at 285.
188. Id. at 281 (assuming that "§ 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that
have a disparate impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible under
§ 601").
189. See generally Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)
(establishing a duty to remedy known violations of federal antidiscrimination regulations).
A Title VI violation means that the recipient has violated its contractual agreement with
the federal funding agency. Sandoval did not alter this contractual relationship; it merely
addressed what contractual violations also provided grounds for private causes of action.
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DeterminingWhat Amounts to Discriminationin a Deliberate
Indifference Theory

Title VI claims hinge on two basic issues:
(1) whether
discrimination has occurred; and (2) whether it was intentional.
Because Sandoval did not question federal agencies' regulatory
authority, the agencies can still prohibit neutral policies with
disparate impacts. 9 ' At no point did the Court in Sandoval claim that
such policies do not amount to discrimination. 1 ' In fact, because the
agencies can prohibit them, implicit in the Court's decision is the
implication that such policies continue to be considered
discriminatory. As discussed above, the key distinction for the Court
is between intentional and unintentional discrimination. 9 2 Deliberate
indifference toward disparate impacts could, however, become
equivalent to intention.'93 If a federal agency has enacted a regulation
or guideline prohibiting certain practices that result in disparate
impact, and the recipient is given actual notice that it is in violation of
Title VI, the recipient should take action to remedy the effect.'94 If,
however, the recipient turns a blind eye, its deliberate indifference
could result in liability. 9 A recipient's conscious choice to ignore or
refuse to remedy the effect causes the disparate effect to continue. 9 6
B.

Reasons DeliberateIndifference Should Extend to Disparate
Impact

One might argue that deliberate indifference toward sexual
harassment is distinctly different from deliberate indifference toward
disparate impact. For example, although a school itself may not be a
harasser, sexual harassment is an intentional act by some individual
that the school tacitly allows to continue, whereas no one may have
intended a disparate impact when one occurs. Such a distinction,
190. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82.
191. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
192. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-81.
193. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 644 (equating deliberate indifference with intention in the
sexual harassment context).
194. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2001) (prohibiting discriminatory effects in services such as
financial aid); id. § 100.7 (requiring the agency to make the recipient aware of any
violation); id. § 100.8 (authorizing the withdrawal of federal funds from recipients that fail
to comply with the section).
195. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that "[w]hen a district is 'deliberately indifferent' to its students' right to a
learning environment free from racial hostility and discrimination, it is liable for damages
under Title VI").
196. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 642-43 (stating a school's deliberate indifference may create
a private right of action under Title IX).
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however, is not meaningful. In neither Gebser nor Davis, the key
Supreme Court deliberate indifference cases, was the school board a
firsthand participant to the harassment.19 7 In both cases, the issue was
whether the school system could become liable for the acts of a third
party that were within the school's control.19 s Further, the Supreme
Court recognized that the school system could in some circumstances,
namely when it is deliberately indifferent, be held liable for the acts
of third parties even though neither the school nor a school official
brought about or engaged in harassment. The Court relied on federal
agency guidelines in these cases that suggested such behavior by third
parties is sexual discrimination, and thus a violation of Title IX for
which a school system might be liable. 9 9 The Court held that once an
official in the school system is made aware of the discrimination, the
official has a duty to attempt to remedy it.2"' Otherwise, the school
contributes to its continuation and is culpable. Thus, courts should
not be reluctant to hold the school liable because cases of deliberate
indifference toward a violation involve a different level of cognition
than situations in which discrimination is occurring unintentionally or
students are being disparately impacted unknowingly.2 1
The above analysis also would apply to disparate impacts under
Title VI. A deliberate indifference theory would not presume to hold
a school privately liable for disparate impacts alone, just as a school
would not be held liable simply because sexual harassment occurred
at school.20 2 In neither the sexual harassment nor the disparate
impact context does the school intentionally contribute to the
discrimination directly. However, just as a school is liable once it
learns of the sexual harassment-which it did not intend, but which is
a Title IX violation-and ignores it, so too would it be liable for
disparate impacts which are Title VI violations, if the school turns a
blind eye to them upon their discovery.
197. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-35; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,
277-79 (1998).
198. Davis, 526 U.S. at 636; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.

199. Davis, 526 U.S. at 647-48.
200. Id. at 649-50.
201. This is an important distinction because holding "innocent" defendants liable
seems to be at the heart of other Supreme Court jurisprudence that prohibits certain
liability. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson, 476 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1986) (noting that the
permissibility of imposing burdens of racial remedies varies with the weight of the burden
to be imposed); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (disapproving
of remedies that are implemented at the expense of innocent individuals absent judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations).
202. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the several requirements for
liability).
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C. Pennhurst Notice
As to the Pennhurstrequirement of clearly attaching conditions
to the receipt of funds,2"3 the Sandoval decision should not present
insurmountable obstacles. Sandoval did not alter recipients' duty to
comply with Title VI disparate impact regulations.0
First, the
prohibition against disparate impact, established by federal
regulations, attaches a clear condition to the receipt of federal
funds.20 5 Second, Supreme Court decisions consistently have held
that federal fund recipients are liable under section 601 for
intentional discrimination.2 6 Third, deliberate indifference to Title
VI violations is equivalent to, or sufficient to establish, intent. 07
Therefore, a federal fund recipient has the requisite notice to make it
aware that if it takes the funds, it may be liable for damages through
private actions.
D. Placing Recipients on FactualNotice
If the courts hold that a private plaintiff may proceed under a
deliberate indifference theory, a factual issue will be presented as to a
second type of notice in addition to the above-mentioned Pennhurst
notice. This second type of notice involves actual knowledge of
presently occurring violations. According to the Supreme Court, a
recipient of federal funds must have notice that a particular practice
has a disparate effect and is a violation of Title VI before it may be
liable for such violation.2 8 The recipient also needs to know the
discrimination has in fact occurred in a program under its control.2 9
In Gebser, the first type of notice was not at issue because it was well
established that sexual harassment is a form of sexual
discrimination.2 10 In Davis, the sexual harassment was student-onstudent and the Court had not previously addressed the issue, nor
made it clear that a school could be held liable for it.211 The Court
stated that the National School Boards Association's proviso warning
school boards of a potential Title IX violation satisfied this prong of
203. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
204. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282 (2001).
205. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2001) (prohibiting discriminatory effects in financial aid and
other services).
206. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-80.
207. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999) (equating
deliberate indifference with intention in the sexual harassment context).
208. Id. at 643-44.
209. Id. at 645.
210. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S 274, 281 (1998).
211. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 637.
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notice.212 Although it had not yet been published at the time of the
discrimination, the Court noted that the Department of Education
guidelines prohibiting such conduct also would have sufficed as notice
to the schools.213
The second prong of notice requires that a violation of Title IX
occur and that an official with the power to remedy it be made aware
of the violation.2 4 Sexual harassment cases may present a clearer
delineation of these issues than do disparate impact cases because
harassment has no justification, whereas there may be legitimate
explanations for a disparate impact. 215 Also, a school might operate a
neutral program that has a slight disparate impact, but without OCR
guidelines, the school may not know whether its program rose to the
level of discrimination. Thus, if a school is unable to identify a clear
violation on its own, there is nothing toward which it is deliberately
indifferent. Conversely, if a school learned that a neutral policy had
an enormously disparate impact, it would immediately know it was
likely a Title VI violation. 216 However, the middle ground between
knowledge and ignorance of a violation probably occupies the
greatest percentage of daily events that create a disparate impact.
Thus, guidelines and interpretations by federal agencies that flesh out
the effects of certain practices would be necessary to establish the
notice.1 7 If a recipient has notice that a disparate impact is a
violation, then that impact becomes something toward which a
recipient may be deliberately indifferent.
212. Id. at 647.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 642, 644.
215. For example, pursuing a legitimate educational goal, such as improving basic skills
through high stakes testing, may be a justification for disparate impact. See, e.g., G.I.
Forum v. Texas, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that the Texas Assessment
of Academic Skills test did not have an impermissible adverse impact on minority students
because it was an educational necessity).
216. Schools may not know whether the impacts are actually violations, but quite often
they are aware of the disparate impacts themselves. Each year schools are required to fill
out forms that report by race and gender the rates of graduation, suspension, gifted
placement, etc. 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b) (2001). Thus, although they may not be aware that
an impact is a violation, they could not claim they were unaware of the impact. Yet it is
important to note again that courts recognize there is a point when disparate impacts are
so high they are intuitively impermissible.
217. For instance, guidebooks on sexual harassment or high stakes testing must tell
recipients which actions are problematic and which are not if a plaintiff is going to show
that a recipient knew it was in violation. See, e.g., OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH &
IMPROVEMENT,
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE:
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD
PARTIES, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034 (Mar. 13, 1997) (detailing the legal framework that schools

can expect to face in dealing with sexual harassment).
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In summary, deliberate indifference standards have yet to be
applied to neutral policies with disparate impacts. Some courts may
be reluctant to take that step because of the differences between a
disparate impact claim and harassment.218
These differences,
however, are largely irrelevant because the underlying actions
constituting sexual harassment or disparate impact are not the
violations for which the recipients would be liable. Instead,
deliberate indifference could theoretically make a recipient liable for
any violation of Titles VI or IX because it is the deliberate
indifference to the violation that makes the recipient institution
liable, not the underlying violation itself. Thus, the only relevant
inquiry should be whether an underlying violation has occurred and
whether the recipient was deliberately indifferent toward it.
IV. ENFORCING TITLE VI REGULATIONS BY PROVING INTENT

The third theory a potential plaintiff could pursue to privately
enforce disparate impact regulations is found by revisiting oldfashioned intent. Essentially, intent can be proven through a
derivation of deliberate indifference. If intent can be shown,
plaintiffs may bring private causes of action under section 601 rather
than section 602. At times, the line that distinguishes deliberately
indifferent acts from intentionally discriminatory acts is relatively
thin.219 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the disparate
impact of a facially neutral policy is not, in and of itself, sufficient to
establish discriminatory intent.2 Yet the Court has explicitly stated
that disparate impact is a good starting point in determining whether
intentional discrimination has occurred. 221 As this Section will
explain, when a recipient undertakes actions that reasonably qualify
as deliberate indifference toward disparate impacts, the recipient

218. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
219. In fact, because of the difficulty in drawing this line, agencies simply cast a broad
net by prohibiting all disparate impacts. Some policies with disparate impact are
intentionally discriminatory or cannot be justified, whereas others are not. For the sake of
efficient regulation, however, the best choice is to prohibit all disparate impacts even
though it may result in preventing certain policies that would otherwise be permissible.
Now that a plaintiff's ability to sue under disparate impact regulations has been withdrawn
in Sandoval, the real issue is at what point disparate impacts may be used to prove intent.
220. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977) (stating that "impact alone is not determinative"); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976) (finding that the disproportionate impact of a verbal skills test
used to hire police officers was not facially unconstitutional).
221. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S at 266.
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creates the circumstances from which one can infer discriminatory
intent.
Often with facially neutral policies, a recipient's intentions are
not readily discernable from the policy. In Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,222 the Supreme
Court stated that the issue of whether a neutral policy bears more
heavily on one race than another (i.e., disparate impact) is a proper
place to begin in determining intent.223 In addition, there will be
instances, as in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,224 when official actions have such
a stark disparate impact that the circumstances make it relatively
easy
225
Of
to infer that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor.
course, most policies will not have a disparate impact that is so stark
that discriminatory intent is unambiguous.226 More often, the
disparities will be subtle enough that statistics or effects alone are
insufficient to prove intent.227
A derivation of the deliberate indifference theory, however, may
be able to bridge the gap between the instances of subtle and stark
disparate impacts. The Supreme Court in Sandoval made it clear that
a policy that merely violates section 602 prohibitions against disparate
impacts does not establish a basis for a private right of action.228 A
good argument, however, can be made that under some
circumstances, such a violation can rise to the level of intentional
discrimination sufficient to violate section 601.229 When the intent of
a policy is unexpressed or discriminatory intent is not clear on the
policy's face, the Supreme Court looks to the totality of the
circumstances to determine intent.230 In Arlington Heights, the
Supreme Court included among these factors: (1) whether a policy
bears more heavily on one race; (2) the historical background of the
policy; (3) the sequence of events leading up to the policy enactment;
(4) any departures from normal procedure; and (5) substantive
departures, "particularly if the factors usually considered important

222. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
223. Id. at 266.
224. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
225. In Yick Wo, a facially neutral policy prohibited the licensing of hand laundries in
wooden buildings except on consent of a commissioner. Id. at 357-58. Consent was
granted to all but one of the non-Chinese applicants but none of the Chinese applicants.
Id. at 359.
226. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
227. Id.
228. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,293 (2001).
229. See LEP example at infra page 388-89.
230. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68.
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by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one
reached."23 ' These factors are by no means exclusive and could vary
depending on the context.232 The essential point is that intent can be
inferred from the totality of the circumstances.
With respect to disparate impacts that violate section 602
regulations, the fifth factor may play a significant role in proving
intent through deliberate indifference. For example, when educators
make educational decisions, the assumption is that they do so with the
intention of improving or maintaining the educational opportunities
of their students, not detracting from them.233 Of course, their
decisions will not always be sound and will, on occasion, have
deleterious effects. In short, educators will at times enact policies that
have disparate effects on racial minorities, and there may be no
discernable discriminatory intent motivating the policy. If deliberate
indifference occurs, however, discriminatory intent can be inferred.
Several specific factual circumstances must exist to show a type
of deliberate indifference that rises to the level of intent, all of which
relate to the fifth factor articulated in Arlington Heights.234 First, the
results of the policy depart from the substantive purpose of the
policy. 235 Second, the result of the policy is a racially disparate
impact. Third, the recipient learns of the impact or that it violates
Title VI. Fourth, the recipient learns that the policy it is using is not
achieving the substantive goal it purports to pursue. Fifth, the
recipient learns, is informed, or becomes aware that an alternative
way to achieve the results without a racially disparate impact exists.
In totality, the recipient is deliberately indifferent to the Title VI
violation/disparate impact, and fails to take a better course of action
that is within its power. In such a case, the recipient's action begins to
be "unexplainable on grounds other than race ' 236 and begins to look
more like intentional discrimination.
For example, a school decides that it is going to institute a new
gifted and talented program to identify gifted and talented students
and provide them with the additional stimulation necessary to keep
231. Id. at 266-67.
232. Id. at 267.

233. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that
courts should be deferential when reviewing the appropriateness of state and local
educational agencies' actions with regard to students with limited English-speaking
ability).
234. 429 U.S. at 267.
235. See id. (recognizing the relevance of decisions that substantively depart from
logical considerations).
236. Id. at 266.

2002]

SANDOVAL AND DISPARATE IMPACT

them engaged in school. The school administers the test in English
only, but a significant number of Limited English Proficient (LEP)
students attend the school and none of them score high enough to
participate in the program. However, some of these students may
have previously been in a gifted and talented program at another
school that utilized different standards, or they may have been
identified within their own school as being gifted through a different
screening procedure. The implication here is that the test is not
accurately identifying gifted students. Some parents notify an
appropriate school official that children are being misevaluated, and
the official is further notified through federal guidelines that this
particular test is not indicative of giftedness or talent in LEP students
and that a better screening process exists. If the school refuses to
change its policy, at this point, the most logical inference is that the
school intends this result. Because a result contrary to the purported
substantive goal of identifying gifted and talented students is being
achieved and other alternatives for achieving the goal exist, the
deliberate indifference by the school provides the basis to infer
discriminatory intent from the disparate effects. Through essential
deliberate indifference, unintentional discrimination becomes
intentional and actionable under section 601.
At first blush, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney237 seems to be relevant to the analysis. Although Feeney is a

sex discrimination case, it addressed broader issues of determining
The Supreme Court in Feeney stated that
discrimination.
"implies more than intent as volition or intent as
intent
discriminatory
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker ...
[acted] at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group. "238 However, this case actually
addressed the idea that effects alone do not prove intent.239 Feeney
involved a state actor that attempted to pursue a legitimate goal
through a policy that resulted in a disparate impact on women.240 But
the important distinction in Feeney was that the means implemented
did in fact achieve the legitimate goal-giving veterans a preference

237. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). In Feeney, the plaintiff challenged a state employment policy
that gave preference to veterans. Id. at 259. Because veterans were overwhelmingly male,
the policy had a disparate impact on females. Id.
238. Id. at 279.
239. Id. at 272 (finding disparate impacts unconstitutional only when they can be traced
to discriminatory intent).
240. Id. at 269.
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in hiring did increase the employment of veterans.241 Thus, the
disparate impact was merely an unintentional byproduct.242
Conversely, the gifted and talented example contemplates a
situation in which the goal of identifying gifted children is not being
achieved and the recipient persists in its action. In such a case, it
cannot be said that the recipient is acting "in spite of" the disparate
impact in order to achieve its goal. The disparate impact is actually
one of the primary results of the policy because its goal is not being
achieved. Furthermore, failure to achieve the goals eliminates
justification for the policy, and leaves the question of why a recipient
would persist in using a policy that does not achieve its end. One
might infer that the policy is being continued "because of" race.
Thus, in the deliberate indifference/intent theory, Feeney would not
preclude a finding of discriminatory intent, which could be proved
along the lines described above. With proof of intent, a plaintiff
could proceed under section 601.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval
diminished civil rights proponents' ability to combat racial
discrimination in federally funded programs. Their right to enforce
section 602 through private causes of action is now seriously in
jeopardy. Aggrieved parties may file administrative complaints
alleging violations of section 602 regulations with federal agencies,
but such measures are unlikely to yield the deterrent or extensive
policing necessary to ensure full and fair participation in federally
funded programs. To protect civil rights, new approaches must be
pursued. Precedent suggests that plaintiffs may be able to pursue
causes of action under § 1983. Although such a route is not
precluded, the Court's perspective in Sandoval and Gonzaga strongly
suggests that such a claim would be rejected if it were to come before
the Court.243 Conversely, the Court has permitted plaintiffs in Title

IX to use a theory of deliberate indifference that is theoretically
applicable to Title VI. Furthermore, a derivation of this theory would
also permit plaintiffs to prove intent and possibly allege a cause of
action under section 601. By litigating these theories, plaintiffs may

241. Id. at 274.
242. Id. at 275 (recognizing that the military preference was not a pretext for gender
discrimination).
243. See supra notes 121-47 and accompanying text.

2002]

SANDOVAL AND DISPARATE IMPACT

391

be able to revive the civil rights the Supreme Court limited in
Sandoval.
DEREK BLACK

